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Today, most European countries accept an active government
role in industrial policy, whereas previously, direct involvement
was confined mainly to services (e.g., railways and electricity).
These countries regard market forces and monetary and fiscal policy as inadequate to influence industrial development.' In the past,
government involvement in industrial development has been
markedly ad hoc; recently, however, there is a move toward a more
integrated approach. Most European economies are faced with certain endemic problems attaching to industrial development, such as
the decline of geographic regions or of particular industries which
have important social ramifications. The extent of government involvement varies: in West Germany, the government adopts a low
profile but conducts sectoral analysis to provide a basis for coordi-

nated industrial policy; in Sweden, the government plays a major
role in manpower planning; in France, overall plans for the econ-

omy are well accepted.2
Since World War II, Britain has experienced chronic produc* B.A., LL.B., 1971, Queensland, Australia; LL.M., 1973, Harvard Law School; D.
Phil., 1976, Oxford University; Research Fellow, Australian National University.
*0 B.A., LL.B., 1967, LL.M., 1969, Delhi University; Lecturer in Law, Faculty of Law,
Delhi University; Ph.D., 1978, Australian National University.
1. Eric Varley, the British Secretary of State for Industry, addressing the American
Chamber of Commerce, voiced an additional reason for greater government involvement:
[tihe sheer scale of.. . modem industry means that the decisions taken by major
companies can have economic, social, and environmental repercussions in wider
and wider areas of society. But also because some of the richest and fastest growing
markets in the world are now either directly in the hands of foreign governments or
subject to their approval.
"Government Will Give Priority to IndustrialNeeds, " Says Eric Varley, 22 TRADE AND INDUSTRY 130 (1976).
2. See generally O.E.C.D., THE INSTRUMENTS OF INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY (1975).
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tivity, capital investment, and balance of payment problems.3 The
major thrust of industrial strategy in recent times has been to improve the structure and performance of industry - in particular, to
make it competitive internationally. Present industrial strategy in
Britain took shape at the famous Chequers meeting in the Autumn
of 1975, where government, industry, and trade unions agreed that
the manufacturing industry had priority in its claim on national
resources.4 That agreement led to the establishment of thirty-nine
tripartite - government, industry, and trade unions - working
parties under the auspices of the National Economic Development
Council, covering some sixty percent of total manufacturing output
and seventy percent of total exports. The primary focus of the
working parties was to identify means of improving British industrial performance.' One aspect has been greater governmental involvement in the private sector to assist exports, restructure
industry, and facilitate new product development.6 Primarily, this
has taken the form of government financial aid to industry through
the National Enterprise Board, the Industrial Development Unit of
the Department of Industry, and the Bank of England; 7 the government has also manipulated the Price Code, taken antidumping action, assisted industrial training, and made adjustments in public

purchasing policy.8
This article focuses on two aspects of present industrial strat-

egy in Britain. The first part examines the direct role government
plays in industry through the National Enterprise Board and the
British National Oil Corporation. Attention is then directed to

planning agreements which, as originally formulated, were intended to function as a national planning mechanism, but which, in
practice, have been over-shadowed by the activities of the sectoral
working parties. 9 These measures are of direct importance to in3. See generally F. KNOX, GOVERNMENTS AND GROWTH (1976).
4. TREASURY, DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY, AN APPROACH TO INDUSTRIAL

STRATEGY

4, CMND. No. 6315 (1975).

5. The reports of the working parties identified matters such as the design of products,
imports, delivery delays, labor problems, factory bottlenecks, and government policies. They
stressed productive efficiency, strong financial assistance, more capacity, more up to date
production, and more aggressive marketing.
6. Corina, Government Assurance on Policy Changes to Support ManufacturingNeeds,
The Times (London), Feb. 3, 1977, at 20, col. i.
7. See generally Ball, Investment Incentives, NAT. WESTMINSTER BANK Q. REV. 22
(Aug. 1973).
8. See IndustrialStrateg -- A ProgressReport, 25 TRADE AND INDUSTRY 410 (1976);
IndustrialStrategy.ProgressReport, 26 TRADE AND INDUSTRY 356, 357 (1977).
9. For discussions of earlier planning attempts, see M. SHANKS, PLANNING & POLIT-
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dustry, including multinational corporations. The National Enterprise Board, for example, is a major shareholder in such
internationally known corporations as British Leyland and RollsRoyce Ltd. Major oil corporations such as Amoco, British Petroleum, Esso, Mobil, and Shell have signed participation agreements
with the British National Oil Corporation relating to the exploration and development of oil fields in the North Sea. The first planning agreement was signed with Chrysler (U.K.) Ltd. in 1977; this
agreement was an outgrowth of government financial assistance to
Chrysler in December, 1975.1°
I.

GOVERNMENT AS ENTREPRENEUR

Government enterprises in Britain, of which the British Broadcasting Corporation and British Airways are examples, have competed directly with the private sector. In a number of cases, entire
industries have been nationalized and competition excluded." The
statutory corporation has been the usual form for government enterprises and nationalized industries. However, as in other European countries, the recent trend in Britain has been for government
to participate in economic activity in much the same manner as
ordinary individuals.' 2 Rather than adopting the form of a statutory corporation, many government enterprises currently utilize the
legal form of an ordinary private corporation wherein the shareholder, or the most prominent shareholder, is the British government. This form offers several advantages for government
enterprises. First, there is no need for special legislation to create
such an entity. Second, it allows for participation by private interests through the sale of shares. Third, government enterprises in
the form of private corporations are more flexible than statutory
corporations in that there is no need for legislation to change their
memoranda and articles. They may also be in a more competitive
position, and are less likely to attract opposition by acquiring the
ics:

THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE

POLICIES IN BRrrAiN

1960-1975 (1977); G.

DENTON, ECONOMIC PLANNING AND

(1968).

10. See text accompanying notes 145-163 infra.

11. This has been the case in the gas, electric, steel, coal, railway, and ship-building
industries. See Daintith, The United Kingdom, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN
MIXED ECONOMIES 192-287 (W. Friedmann ed. 1974).
12. The only major nationalizations of the present Labour government have been of
aircraft and shipbuilding. See Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act, 1977, c. 3. The
National Shipbuilders and Repairers, Ltd. is a corporation limited by guarantee and holds in
trust for the Crown all the publicly owned stocks and shares acquired in various corporations
of this nature between 1970 and 1975. See 926 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th Ser.) 73 (1977).
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appearance of being in a favored position with respect to such matters as procurement of government financial assistance.' 3
Before the establishment of the National Enterprise Board, direct government involvement in private industry was most haphazard. The most notable example before the 1970's was British
Petroleum Co. Ltd. (B.P.), in which the government purchased
shares in 1914, for strategic reasons, and in which it is now a majority shareholder. 14 There have been other instances where the government has purchased shares in private corporations to ensure
survival of an economically vital industry. 5 The Industrial Reorganization Corporation (I.R.C.), a government body endowed with
considerable funds, operated between 1966 and 1971 to aid the rationalization of British industry by making it more competitive internationally. 16 This was accomplished in the main by promoting
voluntary mergers where finance was unavailable through ordinary
commercial channels. Intervention by the I.R.C. sometimes involved the injection of government money through the holding of
corporate shares, but only on a temporary basis."7
Then in 1971, following cash flow problems attendant on the
production of the RB-211 engine for Lockheed, Rolls-Royce went
into liquidation. The government took steps to take over the aeroengine and marine and industrial gas turbine divisions of RollsRoyce because of their economic, defense, and social (employment)
significance. Instead of outright nationalization, which was politically objectionable to the then Conservative government, or of acquiring the corporation's share capital, which would have involved
the government in assuming the corporation's huge financial liabilities, the government purchased the assets described from the receiver and transferred these to a new corporation, Rolls-Royce
(1971) Ltd.' 8
13.
TURES

See W. FRIEDMANN & G. KALMANOFF, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VEN125 (1961); W. ROBSON, NATIONALISED INDUSTRY AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 28

(1960).
14. See Daintith, The Mixed Enterprisein the United Kingdom, in GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISE 53-78 (W. Friedmann & J. Garner eds. 1970).
15. For a list of government shareholdings in 1975, see 901 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.)
193 (1975); 903 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 444-46 (1976).
16. INDUSTRIAL REORGANISATION CORPORATION, CMND. No. 2889 (1966). See also
Industrial Expansion Act, 1968, c. 32; F. BROADWAY, STATE INTERVENTION IN BRITISH INDUSTRY 1964-68, at 62-65 (1969); R. CLARKE, THE MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY 7-8 (1970).

17. For a list of shares held by I.R.C., see 903 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 31 3-14 (1976).
18. Rolls-Royce (Purchase) Act, 1971, c. 9; DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY,
ROLLS-RoYCE LTD. AND THE RB-211 AERO-ENGINE, CMND. No. 4860 (1972); DEPARTMENT
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Different arrangements were used when British Leyland, the
last remaining major British car manufacturer and an important
exporter, faced severe economic difficulties in 1975. A government
report' 9 concluded that the corporation needed fundamental restructuring and investment, the latter estimated to cost some £2.8
billion with inflation over the following seven years.20 Half the
amount could be generated internally, but government finance was
necessary for the remainder because commercial funds clearly were
not forthcoming in the amount necessary. The report considered it
undesirable to provide government financing via direct loans because undesirable gearing would result, because the corporation
would be overburdened with interest payments, and because there
was no guarantee that organizational changes would be implemented. 2 ' Outright nationalization was thought to be politically
unwise; similarly, the option of allowing the corporation to proceed
to receivership before purchasing its assets, as the government had
done with Rolls-Royce in 1971, was discarded. Receivership, it was
thought, would seriously damage the corporation's commercial reputation, particularly abroad, as well as have an unsettling effect on
its industrial relations.22
The government accepted the report's recommendation and
agreed to purchase some £200 million of new equity in the corporation, as well as to provide substantial loans. 23 To achieve this, a
scheme of arrangement was necessary because the government was
clearly reluctant to purchase newly issued shares in the corporation
OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, ROLLS-ROYCE LTD.-INVESTIGATION UNDER S. 165(a)(1) OF THE
COMPANIES ACT 1948 (1973). See also S. YOUNG, INTERVENTION IN THE MIXED ECONOMY

148-55 (1974). The motor car division of Rolls-Royce remained in private ownership. The
liquidation of the original corporation, however, solved two problems. First, the contract
with Lockheed was avoided and with it the severe penalty clauses for delayed delivery. Second, it prevented the government from becoming liable for the debts of the corporation as a
party to its continuation in business - as would have been the case if government loans had
been made - when there was little prospect of new creditors being paid. See Companies
Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 332; Re William C. Leitch Brothers Ltd. No. 1, [1932] 2
Ch. 71, 77,per Maugham, J. Rolls-Royce then negotiated a new contract with Lockheed. By
this contract, Lockheed agreed to pay a higher price for the engine, and not to proceed -with
claims against the receiver for penalties.
19. BRITISH LEYLAND: THE NEXT DECADE, H.C. No. 342 (1975).
20. Id. at 66-72.

21. Id.
22. Id. at 67-69.
23. British Leyland Act, 1975, c. 43. This special legislation was necessary because the
government could not acquire more than 50% of the equity share capital of the corporation
under the Industry Act, 1972, c. 63, § 8.
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at par value when the latter was far in excess of the market value.24
A new corporation was formed, British Leyland Ltd., which offered
to buy the shares and debentures of the existing corporation in exchange for its own shares and debentures. The shares of the new
corporation stood at a reasonable premium over par value, and the
new corporation made a "rights issue." Not surprisingly, private
shareholders failed to take advantage of this development, with the
result that the government, as owner of some of the original shares
and underwriter of the issue, was able to obtain some ninety-five
percent of the shares.2 5
A.

The NationalEnterpriseBoard (NEB.)

1. Creation and Operation of the NEB. The creation of the
N.E.B. marks the first occasion that a British government has committed itself to achieving a permanent shareholding in a considerable number of private corporations. The Labour Party first

adopted the policy in 1961, and in 1973 a study group proposed a
National Enterprise Board when the Party was next in government.2 6 Their report derived much from the work of Stuart
24. A new issuance of shares could have been offered at a discount, but this would have
required the approval of existing shareholders. See Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c.
38, § 57(1).
25. This arrangement was approved by the High Court which rejected arguments of
dissident shareholders requesting a higher offer for their shares or for the corporation to be
liquidated. Templeman J. held that the scheme was reasonable, no better alternative being
possible; that the directors had not been coerced by government pressure and had faithfully
carried out their duties. Although the majority of shareholders voting in favor of this scheme
were large institutional investors, they acted bonafide. Thus, the government could not be
coerced into improving its offer. Go-Aheadfar Leyland Takeover, The Times (London), Aug.
2, 1976, at 15, col. 5. The authors are grateful to Mr. G. McKenna for pointing out that the
institutional shareholders voted for the scheme of arrangement because, although their loss
was substantial - disregarding dividend payments received since purchase - compared
with what they would have obtained if the corporation had been liquidated and the assets
sold, the collapse of a major British corporation would have adversely affected the economy
and their other investments.
A similar scheme of arrangement was used when the government acquired shares in
Alfred Herbert, Ltd. 901 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 400 (1975). The advantage of a scheme
of arrangement is that it needs only the support of a majority of those present (in person or
by proxy) at the shareholders' meetings, as long as they represent three-quarters in value.
26. The Conservative Party prefers simple financial assistance to corporations where
there are sound economic reasons, rather than outright purchase. The Conservative party,
however, has been forced to make such purchases (e.g. Rolls-Royce). The Conservatives
(Tories) are pledged to wind down the N.E.B. and the British National Oil Corporation by
selling most of their shareholdings, and to abandon planning agreements in favor of participation at the plant level. THE RIGHT APPROACH: A STATEMENT OF CONSERVATIVE AIMS
(1976).
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Holland, an academic economist, who argues that without direct

government involvement multinational corporations can frustrate
the social and economic objectives of a socialist government.27 As
actually established by the Industry Act of 1975, however, the
N.E.B. owes much more to the lamentable record of industrial investment in Britain, and to the fact that financial institutions have
exhibited little enthusiasm toward extending medium and longterm finance to further the country's industrial basis.2"

The primary motivation underlying the creation of the N.E.B.,
then, was to provide a new source of investment capital to industry;

a means of efficiently restructuring industry and a channel for
grants to corporations experiencing financial difficulties. 29 These

aims are to be achieved by acquiring permanent shareholdings in
profitable sectors of the manufacturing industry, which is a departure from previous experience when permanent shareholdings have
traditionally been eschewed.3" The N.E.B. is entreated to exercise a

commercial judgment in carrying out its function, to respond
quickly to opportunities, and to obtain an adequate return on its
investments within a reasonable period of time.31 Because it operates with public funds, it is expected, while exercising its commer27. See S. HOLLAND, SOCIALIST CHALLENGE (1975).
28. See J. HUGHES, FUNDS FOR INVESTMENT 4-13 (Fabian Research Series No. 325,
1976).
29. Industry Act, 1975, c. 68, § 2(l)-(2); DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY, THE REGENERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY 7-8, CMND. No. 5710 (1974) [hereinafter cited as WHITE PAPER].
Upon its formation, the N.E.B. became the holding corporation for eight enterprises in
which the government held shares. Presumably the government did not take over all government shareholdings (for example, in British Petroleum) because their overseas dealings
would have been affected and because there was no need for injecting more effective management. See WHITE PAPER, supra at 8. The most important of the eight corporations are
British Leyland and Rolls-Royce; their transfer to the N.E.B. was surrounded by controversy. The N.E.B. objected to the transfer valuation the government wanted to fix (the original cost plus subsequent expenses rather than the much lower current valuation), for it meant
an excessive capital debt to the government and hence a burden on the N.E.B. earning a
reasonable return. Industry Act, 1975, c. 68, § 1, sched. 2. See Corina, Valuation Tussle on
N.EB. Takeover, The Times (London), Jan. 19, 1976, at 15, col. 5.
30. The N.E.B. must obtain the approval of the Secretary of State for Industry before it
or its subsidiaries dispose of any voting shares or stock unless, in the case of subsidiaries, the
consideration involved does not exceed £500,000. NATIONAL ENTERPRISE BOARD, ANNUAL
REPORTS AND ACCOUNTS 57 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT 19771. At the end
of 1977, there had been five approvals sought, four of which were granted. 939 PAR.L. DEB.,
H.C. (5th ser.) 39-40 (1977). A specific limitation on the N.E.B.'s permanent shareholding is
that it must not acquire a shareholding in a corporation whose business is mass media. Industry Act, 1975, c. 68, § 9.
31. ANNUAL REPORTS 1977, supra note 30, at 58. In December 1977, the government
announced a target for the N.E.B. of a 15-20% return on equity holdings by 1981 - excluding British Leyland and Rolls-Royce. 940 PARu. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 355-56 (1977).
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cial judgment, to contribute to the long-term strengthening of the
economy. A specific exception to the general commercial role that
the N.E.B. is expected to play is that it may have to aid an ailing
corporation in the interest of regional employment or industrial
policy.3 2 This function is separate from the N.E.B.'s ordinary operation, and the government must compensate the N.E.B. specifically
to ensure its overall financial ability. In general, the N.E.B. is also
supposed to encourage investment in order to reduce unemployment; this is to be achieved by restructuring and redeploying its
"profitable" operations rather than by supporting projects with little or no future.3 3 Clearly, these various goals could conflict in particular situations.3 4
The government will fund the N.E.B. with loans at the current
rate of interest from National Loan Funds and from public dividend capital - amounts paid to the N.E.B. out of Parliamentary
appropriations. 35 As noted above, the N.E.B. and the corporations
in which it has shares are expected to generate profits, which will
also be available for investment. Under the Industry Act of 1975, a
36
commitment of up to £1 million has been made to the N.E.B.
Under current public expenditure projections, the bulk will be
spent by the end of 1980. The government recognizes that this provision is arbitrary, and intends to keep it under review. 37 In addition to the appropriation under the Industry Act of 1975, N.E.B.
corporations are eligible for funds under the Industry Act of 1972;
considerable amounts paid to British Leyland have come from this
38
source.
The N.E.B. operates through purchasing share capital, forming
corporations, making loans, providing guarantees, and engaging in
joint ventures. 39 Loans, guarantees, joint ventures, or similar forms
of financial commitment cannot exceed £25 million for any single
project without the specific approval of the Secretary of State; when
32. See Industry Act, 1975, c. 68, § 3; ANNUAL REPORTS 1977, supra note 30, at 58.
33. See NATIONAL ENTERPRISE BOARD, ANNUAL REPORTS AND ACCOUNTS 3 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT 1976]. As part of this strategy, the N.E.B. has opened
regional offices in northeast and northwest England.
34. I. PAPPS, GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISE 40 (1975).
35. Industry Act, 1975, c. 68, § 1(9), sched. 2; WHITE PAPER, supra note 29, at 9.
36. Industry Act, 1975, c. 68, § 8(2).
37. THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPENDITURE PLANS, 1978-79 TO 1981-82, vol. II, at 23,
CMND. No. 7049-Il (1978) [hereinafter cited as EXPENDITURE PLANS].
38. See Industry Act, 1975, c. 68, § 3. See also 915 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 502
(1976); 925 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 888 (1977).
39. See Industry Act, 1975, c. 68, § 2(4).
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more than £10 million is involved, or new or significant policy issues are raised, the Secretary of State must be notified so that he
can intervene if he thinks it desirable.' In lending to subsidiaries
and other corporations, the N.E.B. must charge commercial rates of
interest. 4 1 As expected when it was established, the N.E.B. has
acted mainly by making loans and purchasing the equity capital of
existing corporations. 42 Joint ventures in which the N.E.B. was engaged have collapsed, 43 and the only major enterprise which it has
established, to assist British computer firms to market abroad, produced a disappointing response from industry. 44 It was envisaged
that the N.E.B. would also have a role in providing assistance when
a corporation experienced management difficulties, rather than just
financial difficulties, but as yet it does not seem to have acted in
such a case.4 5
2. NE.B. Autonomy. One difficulty encountered in the operation of the N.E.B. relates to the degree of autonomy the N.E.B.
exercises vis-a>-vis the British government and judiciary. The crux
of the problem is the necessity of avoiding excessive governmental
interference while ensuring that the N.E.B. does not exercise such a
degree of autonomy that the public interest is ignored.
In effect, the N.E.B. is free from day-to-day governmental interference.' To ensure N.E.B. operational freedom, the government exercises its oversight through long-term strategies, and in an
annual corporate plan prepared by the N.E.B. The annual plan,
which defines such matters as goals, strategies, investment plans,
40. ANNUAL REPORTS 1977, supra note 30, at 57-58.

41. Id. at 58. Under English law, subsidiaries exist where the holding corporation controls the board or holds more than 50% of the equity. Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6,
c. 38, § 154.
42. ANNUAL REPORTS 1976, supra note 33, at 9-10. In most of the 30 odd corporations

in which the N.E.B. has acquired a shareholding, it has subscribed for newly issued shares;
clearly there would be no advantage as far as injecting financial assistance to firms is concerned in simply buying shares already on the market. In one case, however, the N.E.B.
increased its stake in a corporation by purchasing issued shares when another shareholder
sold its interests. Depending on the circumstances, for example, to maintain adequate gearing, the purchase of shares has been accompanied by the purchase of loan stock and the
making of loans. Id.
43. These ventures involved tendering for overseas construction projects. The N.E.B.
claims the experience gave it valuable information on the problems facing British firms in
such tendering. Id.
44. Id. at 18.
45. Industry Act 1975, c. 68, § 2(4)(h).
46. ANNUAL REPORTS 1977, supra note 30, at 60.
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and annual budgets, is subject to governmental approval.4 7 Yet
other forms of governnlental influence emanate from government
appointments to the Board, and from frequent consultations on investment decisions which are not covered by the annual corporate
plan.
Parliament first debated the N.E.B. in January 1977, about a
year after it had been established, and Parliamentary committees
have complained of their inability adequately to review the Board's
operations.4 8 To a large extent such complaints veil political opposition to the N.E.B. However, there seems no reason why the
N.E.B. should be subject to closer Parliamentary scrutiny than ordinary corporations, particularly when to do so might adversely affect the Board's commercial viability.4 9
Considerable controversy has arisen because the N.E.B., while
subject to government control, is free from judicial and Parliamentary oversight and can thus arrogate to itself power to decide and
implement industrial policy.50 Traditionally, British courts have
been extremely reluctant to interfere with bodies such as the N.E.B.
which enjoy wide discretion. It is unlikely, however, that the judiciary's attitude will change, even in circumstances where it would
be desirable to interfere on social and economic grounds.5 An additional area of potential controversy derives from Britain's membership in the European Economic Community. The latter imposes
limits on government assistance which favors some undertakings or
which distorts competition. At present, however, N.E.B. endeavors
appear to fall within the exceptions recognized in the Treaty of
Rome5 2 in that they assist development in depressed areas, promote
British economic growth, and facilitate development of certain economic activities.5 3
47. Id. at 57.
48. 924 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 826-915 (1977); EIGHTH REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC AccouNTs, H.C. No. 531, Session 1976-77, at xix-xxi (1977). See also
THIRD REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC AccouNTs, H.C. No. 334, Session 197576, at xxvii-xxix, 143-45 (1976).
49. See generaly A. MILLER, THm MODERN CORPORATE STATE (1976).
50. See D. Roy, STATE HOLDING COMPANIES (Young Fabian Pamphlet No. 40, 1974)
and E. DELL, POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY AND INDUSTRY 172-97 (1973).
51. See British Oxygen Co. v. Minister of Technology, [1971] A.C. 610. See also
GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 32.
52. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force, Jan. 1, 1958) (unofficial English translation).
53. Id. at art. 92. See H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY 338 (1976). See also National Carbonising Co. Ltd. v. E.E.C. & National Coal
Board, 2 C.M.L.R. 457 (1975).
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N.E.B. autonomy, and the controversy it has engendered, addresses the relationship between the N.E.B. and the British government and judiciary. A related area of prime importance relates to
the relationship between the N.E.B. and the corporations in which
it acquires a shareholding, specifically with respect to such matters
as takeovers, mergers, access to government capital, and the degree
of actual control the N.E.B. exercises over these corporations.
3. Scope of NE.B. Powers. The N.E.B. has no power to acquire shares compulsorily, but must proceed on the same basis as
any commercial company in its takeover activities. 4 Nationalization is thus necessary if the government wishes to bring a corporation into public ownership where: (1) the N.E.B. cannot acquire a
controlling interest in the ordinary way; or, (2) a corporate structure
is such that shares are only available in a holding corporation, and
the government wants simply to acquire the assets of one of the
subsidiaries."
The Industry Act of 1975 requires the N.E.B. and its subsidiaries to obtain the consent of the government when the cost of acquiring shares in a corporation exceeds £10 million or where the
acquisition would give the N.E.B. thirty percent or more of the voting rights.56 This limitation is clearly to allay business fears that
the N.E.B. possesses unbridled power to acquire shares. An additional factor is that under the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers
a purchaser of thirty percent or more of the voting shares of a listed
corporation 57 is normally obliged to make an offer for all the
shares, which might commit the Board to a substantial expenditure.5 8 In the case of listed corporations, the N.E.B. must notify the
Secretary of State if an acquisition would entitle the N.E.B. to con54.

Industry Act, 1975, c. 68, § 2(4)(h).

55. The Labour Party has a long-term commitment to acquire an interest in pharmaceutical manufacturing, but the latter is nearly always only one aspect of a corporation's business. See, e.g., THE LABOUR PARTY, LABOUR'S PROGRAMME FOR BRITAIN 28 (1976). The

Secretary of State has given a general statutory authority to N.E.B. subsidiaries to acquire
30% or more of the share capital of a corporation, provided that the acquisition is not op-

posed by the directors of the corporation, and that the cost of the total shareholding in the
corporation does not exceed £500,000.
56. Industry Act 1975, c. 68, § 10(1). Approval has been given on a number of occasions
and is mandatory, of course, when a new corporation is being established.
57. Listed corporations are defined in the Companies Act, 1967, c. 81, § 33.
58. The City Code on Take-overs and Mergers § 34 (1976). The City Code, despite its
name, does not have the force of law. It is a self-regulatory covenant issued on the authority
of the City Working Party which consists of several associations of businesses. City Code on
Take-overs and Mergers, Introduction (1976); P. DAVIES, THE REGULATION OF TAKE-OVERS
AND MERGERS 78-79 (1976).
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trol more than ten percent of the voting shares and the directors
have not agreed, or where it would raise new or significant policy
issues. 59 This requirement does not mean that approval will be
withheld, but it places an additional burden on the N.E.B.'s operation, in particular because under the general law a shareholder
must acquire more than ten percent of the voting shares to avoid
being bought out compulsorily.'
A further qualification on the N.E.B. is that it is normally expected to acquire shares in corporations by agreement of its directors.6 ' N.E.B.'s first chairman emphasized that the Board's success
was due to its circumspect measures "to respect confidences and
never to thrust [its] presence" upon corporations, and that "[t]he
only basis on which we do business is the recognition by industry
that we have something real to offer them."'62 However, the government's position is that on occasion the N.E.B. will buy shares in a
corporation without the agreement of its directors, for otherwise it
would be at a major disadvantage when compared with other businesses, and directors would have the power to override the right of
shareholders to sell their shares on a voluntary basis. 63 Because the
N.E.B. is on the same footing as other businesses in takeover situations, its attempt to purchase shares in a corporation has been
thwarted on several occasions by rival takeover bids by a large established corporation.'
When the N.E.B. was established, a major concern of the business community was that the N.E.B. and corporations in which it
held shares would have an unfair advantage when compared with
ordinary corporations, particularly in matters like procurement of,
and access to, government capital. To alleviate such fears, the Industry Act of 1975 explicitly states that the N.E.B. is not a servant
or agent of the Crown, and that it enjoys none of the associated
59. ANNUAL REPORTS 1977, supra note 30, at 57.
60. See Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 209; Industry Act, 1975, c. 68, § 1,
sched. 1.
61. ANNUAL REPORTS 1977, supra note 30, at 57. Compulsory acquisition is possible
with Parliamentary approval where an important manufacturing concern would otherwise
fall under the control of a foreign power inimical to British interests. Industry Act, 1975, c.
68, §§ 11-20.
62. Ryder, Bridge Across the Cash Gap, EUROPA 3, col. 4 (Mar. 1, 1977).
63. GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 5.
64. ANNUAL REPORT 1976, supra note 33, at 18-19. However, in December 1977,
N.E.B. successfully outbid a large British corporation. What isNEB's Philosophy?, The
Times (London), Dec. 6, 1977, at 19, col. I.
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privileges or immunities.6 5 Secondly, the N.E.B. has a legal duty to
exercise its functions in accordance with the accepted practice regarding take-overs, mergers, and listings on the stock exchange.6 6
Finally, the N.E.B. and its subsidiaries are bound by the fair trading legislation and price controls: they must avoid showing undue
preference in their trading relations; they are specifically enjoined
from acting as a pacesetter with respect to terms and conditions of
employment for their employees; and, they are subject to ordinary
taxation - except for stamp duty in certain limited circumstances.6 7 A corrollary to these provisions is that creditors dealing
with an N.E.B. subsidiary are given no guarantees as to payment of
N.E.B.'s debts unless the government undertakes a specific commitment in relation thereto. 68 Furthermore, the provisions of the Act
do not avoid the fact that a corporation in which the N.E.B. has a
shareholding is at a financial advantage over competitors because it
receives financial assistance which would not otherwise be available.6 9

There is no difficulty with the N.E.B. in controlling a corporation in which it holds a majority or all the shares, subject to the
rules relating to fraud on or oppression of a minority of shareholders.70 It is possible under British corporation law for the N.E.B.,
while holding a minority of shares, to control a corporation by
65. Industry Act, 1975, c. 68, § 1(6).
66. ANNUAL REPORTS 1977, supra note 30, at 56. These practices are contained in the
City Code on Take-overs and Mergers (1976) and in LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, ADMISSION OF SECURITIES TO LISTING (1973 as amended). In addition, the N.E.B. is bound to
consult with the Office of Fair Trading before transactions are concluded which may constitute a merger qualifying for investigation by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. This
is a burden which ordinary corporations do not share, although in practice private corporations will consult with the Office of Fair Trading.
67. ANNUAL REPORTS 1977, supra note 30, at 57-58; Industry Act, 1975, c. 68, § 1(7).
68. ANNUAL REPORTS 1977, supra note 30, at 58. There is some argument that the
concept of limited liability should not apply to wholly-owned N.E.B. enterprises which are
operating not so much for commercial as for social (for example, employment) reasons. See
827 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 699 (1971).
69. In April 1977, an application by a group of tanning companies for an interlocutory
injunction to restrain the N.E.B. from investing £3 million in a rival tanning corporation was
dismissed by a judge in chambers. The tanners argued that the N.E.B. had breached its
statutory duty because it was not likely to make a satisfactory profit as required by the
Guidelines. Talbot J. held that even if the tanners were to suffer serious damages from any
breach of duty, there was no basis for an interlocutory injunction although there may have
been a triable issue involved. Harris, Tanners Fail to Obtain an Inuncion Against N.E.B.,
The Times (London), Apr. 30, 1977, at 15, col. 5.
70. See Companies Act, 1948, I & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 210 & 222(0; Burland v. Earle,
[1902] A.C. 83, 93 (P.C.). See generally F. GoRE-BRowNE, GORE-BROWNE ON COMPANIES
786-90 (42d ed. A. Boyle & R. Sykes, 1972).
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utilizing preferred voting rights shares, by means of a shareholder's
agreement, or by provisions in the corporation's articles allowing
the shares held by the government to elect a majority of directors,
or the N.E.B. to veto certain decisions.7" Defacto control can also
result when the N.E.B. has a minority shareholding and other
shareholders are fragmented.
The real issue is not potential control, but how the N.E.B. exercises actual control. Generally, the N.E.B. prefers a monitoring
role to a supervisory role. The degree to which the N.E.B. monitors
corporations in which it holds shares depends on the finance involved, the magnitude of the risk, the size of the corporation, the
capability of existing management, as well as political and other
considerations. Some firms simply need approval for major capital
expenditures and actions which raise controversial issues; others
must prepare annual corporate plans and hold regular progress
meetings with government officials; and yet others must prepare
regular cash flow and profit and loss statements, and perhaps even
monthly commentaries on their order book, capital spending, and
general financial position.7 2 Constant monitoring is necessary if the
government is to avoid a situation either of withdrawing further
support, with the result that an industry closes down, or of making
a further substantial and unanticipated financial commitment.
However, prior to the establishment of the N.E.B., the government
sometimes neglected its monitoring role and regarded a changed
73
management without further pressure as sufficient.
All the shares in Rolls-Royce Ltd. are owned by the N.E.B.
71. While the government has the right to nominate two directors to British Petroleum
who have the power to veto any resolution, this power has never been exercised and the
government is pledged not to interfere in the corporation's affairs except in defense and
security matters. BRITISH PETROLEUM LTD. AND CENTURY OILS GROUP LTD.: A REPORT
ON THE PROPOSED MERGER 7, CMND. No. 6827 (1977).

This agreement differs greatly from that negotiated with International Computers Ltd.
Under the latter agreement, as long as the government holds five percent of the shares it can
veto I.C.L.'s association with any foreign corporation, any major change in its business, and
any disposal of its assets. Computers Merger Scheme, STAT. INST. 1968 No. 990, §§ 10 & 12.
In certain social democracies, such as France and Italy, legislation specifically authorizes government representation on boards of directors in excess of its entitlement under the
normal principles of shareholder representation. See Couzin, The Canada Development Corporation.A Comparative Appraisal, 17 McGILL L.J. 405, 424-27 (1971). See Local Employment Act, 1972, c. 5, § 4(4).
72. See G. GANZ, GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 61-62, 70 (1970).

73. Hogwood, Monitoring Government Involvement in Industry.- The Case of
Shipbidlding, 54 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 409, 413 (1976).
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However, under a memorandum7 4 with the corporation, the corporation continues to operate as far as possible on a normal commercial basis. Although the corporation must comply with the
intention behind the Industry Act of 1975 - for example, to locate
in development areas when possible and to further industrial democracy 7 5 - its day-to-day management is free from N.E.B. interference. Changes in the corporation's board are suggested by the
corporation, whose chairman is entitled to direct access to the government, provided the chairman of the N.E.B. has the opportunity
to attend any such meeting. However, the corporation's long-range
plans, its major investment programs, projects involving capital expenditure of £5 million or more, and any outside borrowing are
subject to N.E.B. agreement.7 6 In addition, the N.E.B. is to be supplied with information enabling it to monitor performance and
financial projects, and to be given advance warning of major issues
which have Parliamentary implications." The agreement with
Rolls-Royce is similar to other agreements negotiated between the
N.E.B. and its corporations, although the degree of monitoring varies." British Leyland, for example, has been subject to greater
scrutiny because of its importance to the British economy and the
past difficulties it has encountered. Theoretically, N.E.B. approval
for British Leyland's investment decisions are subject to improvements in productivity and industrial relations, and to other conditions such as discussion and acceptance of the corporation's plans
by representatives of the workers.79 The N.E.B. has used the threat
that further financial assistance to British Leyland might be curtailed in an attempt to induce workers to improve their productivity
and industrial relations. 80
Legally, a corporation in which the N.E.B. has a shareholding
appoints its own directors, but such appointments are subject to
government approval which can be used to ensure greater control
74. Memorandum of Understanding Between the National Enterprise Board and RollsRoyce (1971), reprinted in National Enterprise Board and Rolls-Royce (1971), The Times
(London), Feb. 27, 1976, at 20, col. I [hereinafter cited as Memorandum]. For the original
agreement between the government and Rolls-Royce, see 874 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.)
389-91 (1974).
75. Memorandum, supra note 74.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See 903 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 310 (1976).
79. See Government Backs BL Plans, 31 TRADE AND INDUSTRY 2 (1978).
80. 927 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 387-88 (1977).
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over a corporation's affairs."' The British Chamber of Commerce
recommends that N.E.B. directors be appointed for all corporations
in which the Board has a shareholding to supervise the expenditure
of public money. In practice, however, the N.E.B. does not regard
Board appointments as importantly as constant monitoring and has
not always exercised its power in this regard.8 2 British company
law requires directors to act in the interest of their corporation,
which means their shareholders, even if this conflicts with other interests; for example, workers' interests or a national interest such as
alleviating unemployment.8 3 Situations can be envisaged where
this might lead to conflict. For example, N.E.B.'s policy of reinvestment for long-term growth or lowering unemployment in a depressed area could clash with the aim of higher short-term profits or
higher dividends. In practice, such conflicts have been avoided in
organizations like British Petroleum, but this is explained by that
corporation's success and the fact that it has never needed financial
assistance. The public interest and that of British Petroleum have
almost always coincided.
British law allows corporations to invest wide power in management," and it is accepted that in large British corporations control may be vested in management rather than in the board of
directors.8 5 Partly in recognition of this, the N.E.B. decided in 1977
that British Leyland should have a full-time chairman - himself a
member of the Board of the N.E.B. - and it is reported that the
86
N.E.B. has full-time officials at other corporations.
B.

British National Oil Corporation (B.N 0. C.)

Britain expects to have self sufficiency in oil by 1980 as a result
87
of the exploitation of offshore discoveries in the North Sea.
81. Parliament, 25 TRADE AND INDUSTRY 648, 650 (1976).
82. EXPENDITURE COMMITTEE (TRADE AND INDUSTRY SuB-COMMITTEE), PUBLIC ExPENDITURE ON CHRYSLER U.K. LTD., MINUTES, H.C. No. 104-ix, at 281 (1976).

83. Parke v. Daily News, [19611 1 W.L.R. 493, 498-99; Scottish Cooperative Society v.
Meyer, [1959] A.C. 324, 363, per Lord Keith of Avonholm.
84. In Re Equitable Fire Insurance Co., [1925] Ch. 407, 426-28; Davies, Employee Participation on Company Boards and Particiation in Corporate Planning, 38 MOD. L. REv. 254,
262 (1975).
85. R. Pahl & J. Winkler, The Economic Elite. Theory and Practice, in ELITES AND
POWER IN BRITISH SOCIETY 102 (P. Stanworth & A. Giddens eds. 1974).
86. Townsend, Leyland's New Chief Offered Job Before Dobson Recognition; NEB Takes
More Direct Control, The Times (London), Oct. 26, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
87. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, DEVELOPMENT OF THE OIL AND GAS RESOURCES OF
THE UNITED KINGDOM 2 (1978).
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North Sea oil, it is hoped, will assist the balance of payments, enhance Britain's international creditworthiness, and contribute to an
increase in wealth through investments to improve industrial performance, as well as investments in energy and increased essential
services.8 8 Government policy is that these aims can only be
achieved if the exploitation and distribution of North Sea oil is
under full government control with majority government participation.8 9 The policy is being implemented along three lines: first, oil
corporations are obliged to pay petroleum revenue tax, in addition
to royalties and corporation tax, to prevent windfall profits;9" second, the actual exploitation of the oil is being closely regulated
through licensing and other means; and third, the government has
established the B.N.O.C. - a government enterprise with the capacity to become a fully integrated oil corporation - to compete
with existing oil corporations.
Regulation and government involvement in the exploration
and exploitation of North Sea oil are felt to be necessary in view of
the continuing allegations that oil corporations have exploited
North Sea oil resources in a way which fails to maximize employment and government revenue; for example, by leaving exploitable
oil in the ground where to do so maximizes the return on investment.9 1
1. Regulation of PetroleumResources. British law vests in the
Crown the absolute ownership of oil and gas resources, but provides that licensees can explore and exploit those resources subject
to the payment of license fees and royalties. 92 Licensing procedures
can be effectively used to regulate the development of new fields
and the production rates from fields onstream. These procedures
are used at present to maintain exploitation at a reasonably stable
level. Additionally, smaller amounts of territory are being licensed
at more frequent intervals than previously.9 3 Government policy
88. THE CHALLENGE OF NORTH SEA OIL 3-4, CMND. No. 7143 (1978).
89. UNITED KINGDOM OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS POLICY 3, CMND. No. 5694 (1974).

90. Oil Taxation Act, 1975, c. 22.
91. See P. ODELL & K.
OILFIELDS (1976).

ROSING, OPTIMAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH SEA'S

92. Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 36, §§ I & 2; Continental Shelf
Act, 1964, c. 29, § 1; Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1976, STAT. INST. No. 1129.
93. Most licenses in the United Kingdom have been granted by ministerial discretion
rather than by competitive bidding. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, OIL FROM THE U.K. CONTINENTAL SHELF 8 (1976); Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1976, STAT. INST. No. 1129, §
6(6). See also D. MACKAY & G. MACKAY, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NORTH SEA OIL

24-25 (1975).
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dictates that licensees are expected to process approximately twothirds of United Kingdom oil in Britain, and that, ideally, exports
should be in the form of products other than crude.9 4 In addition to
licensing, legal regulation of oil and gas requires government approval for the construction of pipelines in offshore waters, the
95
building of new refineries, or the expansion of existing capacity;
entrusting the British Gas Corporation (a nationalized industry)
with a monopoly on supplying natural gas;96 and measures to further safety and to control pollution. 97
The establishment of B.N.O.C. represents a move beyond
mere legal regulation to a situation where a government body both
participates and competes with oil corporations in the exploration,
exploitation, and distribution of oil resources. In this sense, the establishment of the B.N.O.C. emulates developments in other European countries which have established government oil corporations
to carry out the whole range of activities from discovery to retailing. 98 B.N.O.C. participation ensures government access to information on costs, profitability and reserves, and at the same time
influences private oil corporations on matters like investment and
the rate of depletion. 99 Competition secures for the state, profits
that would otherwise go to the oil corporations and may stimulate
the latter to act to a greater degree in the interests of consumers.
2. The Role ofB.N.0. C. B.N.O.C., a statutory corporation, is
empowered to search for and exploit petroleum existing in its natu94. 882 PARL. DEB., H.C. 646-48 (1974).

95. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-Lines Act, 1975, c. 74, §§ 20 & 34.
96. Energy Act, 1976, c. 76, § 8(l)-(2). Natural gas for industrial purposes may be provided by private corporations if the Secretary of State approves. The Energy Act of 1976
gives the Secretary of State wide power to regulate or prohibit the production, supply, acquisition, or use of petroleum, natural gas, petroleum products, and any other fuel. Prohibition
or regulation of use may only be implemented for the purpose of price control. Direct price
controls may also be imposed. Id § 1.
97. See, e.g., Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act, 1971, c. 61; Health and
Safety at Work, etc. Act, 1974 (Application Outside Great Britain) Order 1977, STAT. INST.
No. 1232; Submarine Pipelines (Diving Operations) Regulations 1976, STAT. INST. No. 923;
Prevention of Oil Pollution Act, 1971, c. 70. See also Offshore Petroleum Development
(Scotland) Act, 1975, c. 8. This act regulates the use of land for oil platform construction.
98. Government oil corporations in other European countries include: E.L.F. (France);
E.N.I. (Italy); STATOIL (Norway); and HISPANOIL (Spain). See H. MADELIN, OIL AND

POLITIcs 103-09 (1975) on whether the establishment of B.N.O.C. breaches E.E.C. antitrust
provisions. See also Woodliffe, North Sea Oil and Gas - The European Community
Connection, 12 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 7, 14-15, 18-20 (1975).
99. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES AND THE EXPLOITATION OF
NORTH SEA OIL AND GAS 3-4, CMND. No. 6408 (1976).
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ral state in any part of the world; to process it; to deal in it; and to
give effect to agreements with a view to securing participation by
the government - or B.N.O.C. on its behalf - in activities connected with petroleum in "controlled waters."" Without prejudice
to these powers, B.N.O.C. can provide and operate pipelines,
tanker-ships, and refineries, and can carry out research in connection with petroleum.' 0 ' B.N.O.C.'s general policy must be approved by the government, and the Secretary of State can give it
directions, general or specific, as it deems appropriate. 0 2 Finance
for B.N.O.C. comes from National Loan Funds, the National Oil
Account - the latter including payments of license fees and royalties made by the oil corporations - and more recently from loans
by commercial institutions. The corporation also benefits by an exemption from petroleum revenue tax. 0 3 Additionally, the government has the power to take royalties in the form of oil rather than
money, which can be allocated to B.N.O.C.' °
To fulfill its role in exploring for and exploiting oil, B.N.O.C.
proceeds in a number of ways. First, B.N.O.C. has succeeded to the
interests in established North Sea oil fields held by the National
Coal Board (a nationalized industry) and most of those held by
Burmah Oil Company Ltd.; N.E.B. has also been allocated some
interests in its own right.'0 5 Second, B.N.O.C. benefits under the
participation agreements which have recently been signed by the
government and those oil corporations that were issued licenses in
the first four rounds of bidding between 1964 and 1972. l°6 Under
most of these participation agreements, B.N.O.C. has an option, exercisable in the medium future - three to five years - to purchase
100. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-Lines Act, 1975, c. 74, § 2(1). "Controlled waters"
means the territorial'sea adjacent to the United Kingdom and the sea in any designated area
within the meaning of The Continental Shelf Act of 1964, c. 29.
101. Id. § 2(2).

102. Id §§ 3 & 4. B.N.O.C. must have the permission of the Secretary of State to search
for or obtain petroleum outside Great Britain, to refine or deal in petroleum products, to
participate in the formation of a corporation or to acquire or relinquish membership therein,
to borrow or lend money, to change its assets, to give guarantees, or to provide advice or
assistance outside the United Kingdom. Id. § 2(4).
103. Id. §§ 7 & 40.
104. Id. §§ 17 & 19, sched. 2, pt. I, § 8c.
105. Id. § 13; 915 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 167-68 (1976). The Burmah purchase involved a government directive to B.N.O.C. under § 4(1) of the Act because of a disagreement
between B.N.O.C. and the government over the correct valuation of Burmah's assets.
106. By mid-February, 1977, agreements had been signed in definitive form with 25 companies. DnPmTmENT OF ENERGY, supra note 87, Appendix 5.
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07
at market price up to fifty-one percent of any oil produced.
B.N.O.C. is also made a joint licensee in each field, and hence has a

seat and a vote -

but not a veto -

on the operating committees

Some of the larger oil corporations have the
developing them.'
right under their participation agreements to repurchase enough of
the oil -

up to 100% in some cases -

at the same price paid by

B.N.O.C. to service their refining and marketing operations in Britain.1t09 The proportion taken back will depend in most cases on an
annual appraisal of a corporation's operations by the government,
with B.N.O.C. acting as adviser. Further, in some cases B.N.O.C. is
entitled to exchange part of the repurchased oil for oil a corporation obtains from other sources. In some participation agreements,
B.N.O.C. executives have a right to attend the marketing and refining committees of the oil corporations in order to gain expertise, as
long as B.N.O.C. does not engage in this aspect of business. 110
For political reasons the government preferred the option system via participation agreements to the statutory expropriation of
oil. Great stress was laid on the voluntary nature of participation
agreements, and that their legal nature was of an ordinary commercial contract."' One early agreement was signed because a small
exploration corporation needed a government loan, and in a subsequent but similar case B.N.O.C. was able to guarantee a loan for a
five percent royalty and signature of a participation agreement." 2
The threat inducing other oil corporations to sign participation
agreements was that otherwise they would be excluded from future
107. Early in the negotiations, the government threatened to expropriate, for fair compensation, the 51% interest. 886 PARL. DEB. (5th ser.) 1341-42 (1975). The option system
avoided the cost of expropriation. Smaller oil corporations are not greatly affected by the
option system since they have no need for guaranteed supplies to utilize refining capacity;
they will simply sell to B.N.O.C. rather than elsewhere.
108. Lord Kearton, the first chairman of B.N.O.C., regarded the information and expertise acquired by participation on the operating committees as more important than the options. Bell & Richardson, The Sheikh ofAberdeen, The Sunday Times (London), Jan. 23,
1976, at 59,col. 1. See also 904 PARL.DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 957-61 (1976).
109. See, e.g., Vielvoye, BP and Government Sign Wide-Ranging Deal on North Sea
Participation, The Times (London), July 2, 1976, at 21, col. 1. Other terms included in some
of the agreements are that the corporation undertakes to use any United Kingdom continental shelf oil from existing licenses in support of its United Kingdom feedstock requirements;
to optimize the use of such oil in relation to the United Kingdom market; to trade at a fair
price, thus attempting to safeguard government petroleum revenues; and to maximize the
benefits to Britain's balance of payments.
I10. Id.
S11. The Participation Agreement Act, 1978, c. I.
112. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-Line Act, 1975, c. 74, § 42; Annual Report 1977,
supra note 47.
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licensing rounds.'" 3 Amoco, for example, objected to signing such
an agreement, which led to its exclusion - as well as groups in
which Amoco participated - from the fifth round of licensing in
1977.114 Subsequently, Amoco conceded the principle of participation and a participation agreement was signed."- 5
The third manner in which B.N.O.C. engages in the exploration and exploitation of North Sea oil is that a majority state participation is ensured through the licensing conditions attaching to new
licenses, including those issued in the fifth round of licensing in
1977 116 B.N.O.C. - except in a few cases where the British Gas
Corporation obtains a stake - has a mandatory fifty-one percent
interest in new licenses and is thus entitled to a fifty-one percent
share of all the benefits, including a corresponding share of any oil
produced and income accruing, and to a commensurate voting
power on any operating committee. 1 7 As a corollary, B.N.O.C. is
responsible for its full share of the exploration and development
costs as they are incurred for those fields in which it decides to participate." 8 Another condition of the fifth and subsequent rounds of
licensing is that each group of co-licensees must agree to a pro
forma operating agreement drawn up by the government defining
the working relationship between B.N.O.C. and the licensees." 9
Through the participation agreements for the earlier licenses
and the licensing conditions attaching to new licenses in the fifth
and subsequent rounds, B.N.O.C. is now involved in thirteen of the
seventeen fields in production or under development in the North
Sea. Although B.N.O.C. is entitled to conduct downstream refining
and marketing activities, it has decided to abstain from these activities until the 1980's, in part because it is still bolstering its expertise
and in part because Britain has excess refining capacity for the time
113.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, UNITED KINGDOM PRODUCTION LICENSING: FIFTH

ROUND-A CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT

(1976).

114. Vielvoye, Oil License Snub for Amoco as Whitehall Makes Good its Warning, The
Times (London), Feb. 10, 1977, at 19, col. 1.
115. Amoco's objection was that participation agreements infringed accrued rights and
gave B.N.O.C. access to confidential information on refining and marketing plans. The government's answer was that "options" were of a "no win no loss" nature and were a much
better deal than oil corporations could expect in other jurisdictions where confiscation was
common. 908 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 22 (1976).

116. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, supra note 113. See generaly Petroleum (Production)
Regulations 1976, supra note 92; Woodliffe, State Particoationin the Development of United
Kingdom Offshore Petroleum Resources, [19771 PUB. L. 249.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, supra note 113, Appendix 1.
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being. By then, however, B.N.O.C. anticipates an oil shortage and
envisions the possibility of disposing of its crude to established oil
20
corporations in exchange for refining and marketing concessions.
II.

PLANNING AGREEMENTS

Planning Agreements represent the second of two institutions
recently introduced by the British Government under the Industry
Act of 1975; the other is the N.E.B."2 ' The basic theme of planning
agreements is to create a closer relationship between the government and industry for the achievement of national needs and objectives. The Industry Act of 1975 defines a "planning agreement" as
a voluntary arrangement as to the strategic plans of a body corporate for the future development in the United Kingdom over a
specified period of an undertaking of the body corporate . . .
being an arrangement entered into by the body corporate and
any Minister of the Crown which in the opinion of that Minister
is likely . 1.22. to contribute significantly to national needs and
objectives.
The White Paper, produced in August 1974, gave pride of
place to the notion of planning agreements between major corporations and government. It stated that these were to be nonenforceable arrangements under which private and public investment and
development plans would be coordinated in the interests of more
stable economic management. 12 3 It was further pointed out, however, that planning would be given sufficient recognition by statute
to enable a concerned corporation to rely on assistance promised
under the agreement.' 24 The agreements were to be regarded not
so much as contracts in the ordinary sense, but as a means of
achieving a new relationship between the government, a corporation, and its workers where consultation was of the essence. 125 The
120. Rodgers, Bonn Sicher Up German Oil Deal, The Sunday Times (London), Jan. 9,
1977, at 58, col. 7.
121. Industry Act 1975, c. 68, § 21. The Secretary of State for.energy has described
participation agreements as a form of planning agreement in that corporations inform the
government of such matters as production levels, refining through-put and output, pricing
policies and investment plans. See Shell/Esso Sign Outline Pact on North Sea Participation,
The Times (London), Jan. 6, 1977, at 15, col. 5.
122. Industry Act, 1975, c. 68, § 21(2).
123. WHrrE PAPER, supra note 29, at 3-4.
124. Id. at 3. A government spokesman later observed that although a planning agreement would not be a civil contract, it would represent a statement of firm intent by both
sides. See 907 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 179 (1976).
125. - 886 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1069-70 (1975). See Page, The IndustryAct 1975,
[1976] J. Bus. L. 130, 138.
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planning agreement has been variously described as a cooperative,
continuing, growing, developing, or voluntary arrangement. It is
said to be based on an exchange of information and on the development of a relationship between the government and corporations,
their employees, and trade unions, and not merely on an exchange
of financial benefits or an exchange of legal or technical obligations.12 6 The government does not intend to make a planning
agreement with a corporation which has not achieved, or shown
signs of achieving, the development of a satisfactory
relationship
27
employees.
its
with
issues
of
range
over a broad
The concept of planning 128 agreements

29

is not a new one, but

reflects the development of a practice in a number of European
countries. 130 In implementing its various economic plans, the
French administration, for example, often enters into contracts called contrats deprogramme-

with private industry in which the

latter agrees to do something desired by the administration in exchange for some benefit conferred in return.' 3' The French have
used this special tool to administer the economy and industrial democracy in a technological society. The contractual mechanism
has also been used by the French government to discuss with an
individual corporation that corporation's problems and prospects.
For example, corporations have been allowed under these agreements to raise prices outside government price controls in order to
finance investment, subject to their compliance with the objectives
126. OFFICIAL REPORTS, H.C., STANDING COMMrIrEE E ON THE INDUSTRY BILL 1975,

1171, 1173, 1184-85, 1301 (1975) [hereinafter cited as STANDING COMMITTEE E]. See also
The Contents of a PlanningAgreement, 20 TRADE AND INDUSTRY 338 (1975).
127. STANDING COMMITTEE E, smpra uote 126, at 1446. In order to be effective, planning
agreements require a genuine commitment from both sides. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON CHRYSLER U.K. LTD. 14, CMND. No. 6745 (1977).
128. The term "planning" is used to describe the rationale of economic regulation in
modem industrial society. It implies the establishment of objectives, the creation of means of
achieving them, and the implementation of an integrated program.
129. The term "agreement" is defined as
a concord of understanding and intention between two or more parties with respect
to the effect upon their relative rights and duties, of certain past or future facts or
performances; the consent of two or more persons concurring respecting the transmission of some property, right, or benefits, with the view of contracting an obligation, a mutual obligation.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 89 (4th ed. 1968). Although the term "agreement" is often used
synonymously with "contract," M. RADIN, LAW DICTIONARY 13 (2d Rev. ed. 1970) and J.
BALLENTINE, DICTIONARY 53-54 (3d ed. 1969), here it is used in a much broader sense.
130. See J. HAYWARD & M. WATSON, PLANNING, POLICS AND PUBLIC POLICY-THE
BRITISH, FRENCH AND ITALIAN EXPERIENCE (1975).

13 1. Bergsten, The Adnnistration of Economic and Social Programs in Franceby the Use
ofthe ContractualTechnique, 48 So. CAL. L. REv. 852, 879-80 (1975).
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on output, investment, and exports of the national plan. 132 Since
1968, Italy has also used similar contracts - referred to as
"Planned Bargaining" - with leading corporations as part of its
national plan. These agreements are designed to establish a constructive dialogue between government and industry with an eye
toward examining and harmonizing their respective programs of
action. Like the British planning agreements, the Italian Planned
Bargaining procedure consists of an exchange of information between the government and industry on their respective investment
33
plans so that their projects can be harmonized effectively.
Belgium has also employed similar contracts since 1969; parties to
these agreements include the government, trade unions, and the relevant trade associations. 134
A.

Objectives and Contents of PlanningAgreements

In their application to the private sector, the system of planning agreements is expected to provide a new and improved framework for cooperation between the government and leading
industrial corporations. The primary purpose of a planning agreement is to bring the government's projections and a corporation's
own intentions and plans into a state of harmony. They are intended to increase mutual understanding between industry and
government so as to improve the effectiveness of existing government policies. Planning agreements are also expected to improve
and influence the development of the government's own central economic policy, and to further a new and improved opportunity for
workers to be consulted about and involved in a corporation's forward plans.
It is anticipated that discussions leading to the conclusion of a
planning agreement will include such diverse topics as: economic
prospects; the corporation's broad strategy and long-term objectives; United Kingdom sales; exports, investment, employment, and
training; productivity, finance, and prices policy; industrial relations and arrangements for negotiation and consultation; the interest of consumers and the community; and product and process
development.

35

132. Pariament, 26 TRADE AND INDUSTRY 623, 624 (1977); 886 P~A.. DEB., H.C. (5th
ser.) 975 (1975).

133.
134.
135.
1975, at

See HAYWARD & WATSON, supra note 130, at 128-40.
Parliament, supra note 132, at 624.
See Discussion Paper, infra note 138. See also T. SHARPE, THE INDUSTRY AcT
61-63 (1976).
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The definition of planning agreements 36 envisions that they
will include arrangements between industry and government likely
to contribute significantly to national needs and objectives. The
agreements will be concerned with economic objectives, while concomitantly serving perfectly proper commercial purposes. However, they are not to be viewed as purely commercial, since they
will also be concerned with the wider social and political objectives
of the government; for example, the regional location of employment and the protection of the interests of consumers and of the
community on which other than wholly commercial criteria operate.
Planning agreements will be tailor-made to the circumstances
of each case. 37 A series of consultations between the government
and corporations, eventually leading to an agreement about strategic plans, will occur annually with provisions for revising the agreement during the course of the year as circumstances require. These
annual consultations will be timed to coincide with a corporation's
own planning cycle. In their discussions with corporations, the
government will be concerned essentially with strategic issues. In a
1975 Discussion Paper, 138 the government stated that it was well
aware that commercial plans and forecasts of corporations frequently have to change on short notice to keep up with changes in
the market.139 Clearly, it is essential that planning agreements
avoid restricting a corporation's freedom to respond to market fluctuations, especially where corporations are in competition with
overseas manufacturers. The need to respond to this contingency
will have to be reflected in the final form of the planning agreement
- for this reason alone the agreements must be flexible. As well as
including firm statements on strategic issues, the planning agreement should also set forth those circumstances which might give
rise to changes in particular plans and projects, and provide arrangements for consultation as necessary. It was further stated in
the Discussion Paper that the government envisioned that planning
agreements would record a company's objectives and policies, the
ways in which these could be harmonized with the government's
economic strategy, and the action that government, management,
and, where appropriate, trade unions intended to take to ensure
136.
137.
138.
(1975).
139.

See note 122 supra.
STANDING COMMITTEE E, supra note 126, at 1164.

Reprinted in The Contents of a PlanningAgreement, 20 TRADE AND INDUSTRY 338
Id.
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that corporation plans and projects which had been reviewed and
endorsed during the course of the discussions were successfully carried out. "0
The subjects covered in the discussions leading to a planning
agreement, and the importance which is to be attached to each, is
expected to vary from corporation to corporation. The content of
the agreements will reflect the extent to which long-range planning
is feasible for a particular technology or market situation. It will
also reflect the differing conditions in which corporations find
themselves. For example, in one case the central issue may be the
financing of investment, while in another it may be the opportunity
for major increases in export sales.
Although no statutory limitation is placed upon the nature of
the enterprise which may enter into a planning agreement, the government has announced that the principal application of planning
agreements will be to large corporations; that is, Category One
companies.' 4 ' Category One companies, broadly speaking, include
manufacturers with total annual home sales of £50 million or more,
companies with total home sales of £20 million or
and service
42
more. 1
B.

Benefits of a PlanningAgreement

There are several benefits for corporations in the planning
agreement system. First, as noted above, these agreements will aid
the development of a better government understanding of private
industry and of an individual corporation's plans and problems,
which in turn will influence the government's development of industrial, economic, and other relevant policies. In the past, large
corporations have felt that the greatest weakness of their forward
140. Id. at 339.
141. Parliament, 27 TRADE AND INDUSTRY 384, 387 (1977).
142. Id. The first planning agreement was concluded with Chrysler (U.K.) Ltd. Payments totalling £40 million have been made by the government under the agreement. Additionally, certain advances with respect to a guaranteed loan have also been made under the
agreement, but for reasons of confidentiality the amount has not been disclosed. The agreement covers the period 1976 to 1980. See Parliament, 26 TRADE AND INDUSTRY 494 (1977).
Seven other major corporations have agreed to enter planning agreement discussions. Varley
Announces Chrysler Planning Agreement, 26 TRADE AND INDUSTRY 610 (1977). These
achievements are far removed from the aim of the Trade Union Congress: planning agreements with the top 100 corporations by 1978. However, the government says that it remains
fully committed to the concept. Parliament, 29 TRADE AND INDUSTRY 550-51 (1977);
Tinnion, The Industry Act of 1975 and IndustrialStrategy, 5 INDUS. L.J. 80, 87 (1976).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol9/iss1/17

26

Cranston and Puri: Government As Entrepreneur and Planner: Aspects of Recent Industr
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 9

planning was the uncertainty of government action. 4 3 Planning
agreements will lead to greater commitment by government to the
economic objectives of corporations - to their investment, to their
employment creation, and to their economic purposes in general.
Second, planning agreements will provide an improved framework
for consultation between the public and private sectors and for coordination of all pertinent governmental departments. Within this
framework, the discussion should strive to identify specific constraints which inhibit profitable growth as well as identify areas for
coordinated action between government departments and the corporation. Third, planning agreements will secure for the corporation specific commitments from government to address the
particular problems it is experiencing; commitments which, because
they are incorporated into the agreement, can be monitored by the
corporation. Fourth, an important aspect of the planning agreement system is the development of improved labor-management relations;' 44 planning agreements will provide a means of improving
employee participation, of building, in a flexible way, on a corporation's existing employee participation arrangements to secure cooperation with the workforce in carrying out the corporation's plans.
Finally, the system will provide considerable financial benefits to
planning agreement companies, the first of which emanates from
the provisions of the Industry Act of 1972. Government financial
assistance is perhaps the main incentive inducing corporations to
enter into a planning agreement; it was for this reason that Chrysler
(U.K.) Ltd. signed such an agreement in 1977.145 There are two
types of government financial assistance available to companies
that have entered into planning agreements: regional development
grants and selective financial assistance.
Under the Industry Act of 1972, the Secretary of State may
make a regional development grant towards approved capital expenditure incurred on new buildings or works, 47 or on the adaptation of existing buildings or works where they form part of
143. See W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH 31 (rev'd ed. 1967).
144. See notes 125-127 supra.
145. See notes 142-143 supra. There is no statutory requirement for a company to enter
a planning agreement. In addition to financial assistance, the government uses government

contracts, industrial development certificates, and export credit guarantees as inducements to
companies to sign planning agreements. WHITE PAPER, supra note 29, at 3-4.
146. Industry Act, 1972, c. 63, § 1(1).
147. Id. § 6(2).
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"qualifying premises"' 4 8 in development areas or intermediate areas; on new machinery and plants for use in qualifying premises in
development areas, 149 or in the construction of industry in development areas; 150 and on mining works provided for use in development areas.' 5 ' The amount of grant is, in general, twenty percent
of the expenditure on the asset. 152 Grants may be subject to condi53
tions, including a condition for repayment in whole or in part,
and comprehensive provisions with regard to the enforcement of
to them, including provisions as to offenses
conditions are attached
54
and penalties. 1
The Secretary of State is empowered to guarantee planning
agreement corporations the level of a regional development grant
with respect to approved capital expenditure on projects identified
in the agreement, at rates which are not lower than those applying
In addition, it is provided
when the agreement was concluded.'
that "in the case of a project which was also identified in a previous
planning agreement" the rate of grant will not be less than that
which was prescribed at the date of the earlier planning agreement. 156 Planning agreement corporations are thus given a statutory guarantee that the level of regional development grants for
identified projects will not be reduced during the lifetime of each
agreement.' 57 The grants will be paid to them on the basis of the
law existing at the time of the conclusion of the planning agreement, notwithstanding any later changes that may be made by statutory order.
The second form of government financial assistance, selective
financial assistance, is guaranteed under part II of the Industry Act
of 1972.158 For projects identified therein, the Act provides for
selective financial assistance to industry in assisted areas' 59 where
the assistance is likely to provide, maintain, or safeguard employ148. Id. § 2(2).
149. Id. § 1.
150. Id.
151.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
Woolen

Id.

Id.table, § 1.
Id. § 4.
Id. §§ 4 & 11, sched. 1.
Industry Act, 1975, c. 68, § 21(l)(a).
Id. § 21(l)(a)(ii).
See British Oxygen Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Technology, [19711 A.C. 610; Australian
Mills Proprietary Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 92 C.L.R. 424 (1954), aft'd, 93 C.L.R. 546

(1955).
158. Industry Act, 1972, c. 63, §§ 7-9.
159. "Assisted areas" are enumerated in the Industry Act, 1972, c. 63 § 7(7).
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ment in those areas,"6 or where it is likely to benefit the economy
or any part or area of the United Kingdom. 6 ' Selective financial
assistance may be given on any terms or conditions, and by any
description of investment, lending, or guarantee, or by making
grants. 162 This statutory guarantee confers substantial financial
benefits to a planning agreement corporation. The statutory guarantee is an important response to industry's demand that there be
greater certainty in its dealings with government
and provides a
63
firmer base for corporate decision-making.
C. Enforceability of PlanningAgreements
The government has repeatedly declared that planning agreements are nonenforceable arrangements, in that they are not agreements in the sense of civil contracts enforceable at law." 64
Nevertheless, the full meaning of "nonenforceability" has never
been fully explained. If by "nonenforceability" it is meant that
planning agreements are not binding on the parties; that a corporation, having received one form or another of financial assistance
from the government for a specified project, accompanied by a
guarantee of non-reduction during the lifetime of the agreement,
may flout the agreement or squander the grant for extraneous purposes with impunity; 65 or that a corporation promised financial
assistance for a project named in the planning agreement may
never get it; or that the assistance may be discontinued or reduced,
as the case may be, then planning agreements would be rendered
absurd. Complete nonenforceability does not seem to be the inten160. Id. § 7.
161. Id. § 8.

162. Id. § 7(3).
163. See Holland, The National Enterprise Board and Planning Agreements, GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY RELATIONSHIPS 29-33 (D. Lethbridge ed. 1976).
164. See, e.g., 907 PARL DEB., H.C. (5TH SER.) 179 (1976).

165. The Industry Act, 1972, c.63, §§ 4 & 11, sched. 1 contains comprehensive provisions
with respect to the enforcement of conditions attached to grants, including provisions as to
offenses and penalties. Paragraph I of the schedule makes it obligatory for a corporation
which has received a grant to furnish such information, or to produce such books, etc. for the
purpose of enabling the Secretary of State to determine whether any condition subject to

which the grant was made is satisfied or is being complied with, or whether the grant had
become repayable in whole or in part in accordance with any such condition. Paragraph 2
gives the right to enter and inspect the premises where any asset which relates to a grant is
located. Paragraph 3 provides that a breach of the provisions of paragraphs I or 2 would
make a person guilty of an offense and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding
£400 or £50 respectively. This paragraph also provides that any person who in purported
compliance with a notice under paragraph I knowingly or recklessly makes any statement or
produces any document which is false in a material particular shall be guilty of an offense.
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tion of the government. The Minister of State for Industry, for example, has confirmed that a promise by the government to
guarantee the level of appropriate financial assistance for a project
identified in a planning agreement will be legally binding.' 66 Conversely, it follows that a recipient corporation will be bound by law
to spend the money in the manner prescribed, or be liable for the
legal consequences. Undoubtedly, the granting and continuation of
the non-reduction guarantee is conditioned on the company's compliance with the terms of the agreement. This is not to say that the
corporation must guarantee that it will perform its obligations absolutely, for the government
expressly acknowledges that market
167
conditions can change.
Although planning agreements imply reciprocal legal obligations, they are not completely enforceable as contracts. For instance, remedies such as the recovery of damages - including loss
of anticipatory profits - specific performance, and injunctions,
which are normally available to an aggrieved party in a breach of
contract action, will not be available to planning agreement parties.
For planning agreements, unlike contracts, strive to develop a
closer and more continuous relationship between the parties in a
flexible and informal setting. To render planning agreements wholly enforceable as contracts would likely subvert this goal.' 68 In actuality, it appears that the planning agreement system confers more
rights upon private industry than ordinary government contracts,
for under the former either party may withdraw from the agreement in certain events, whereas under the latter only the government may do so - for example, under unilateral termination or
169
break clauses.
III.

CONCLUSION

At present it is only possible to offer an interim assessment of
166.

"PlanningAgreements Misunderstood"--Kaufman, 26 TRADE AND INDUSTRY 476

(1977).
167. STANDING COMMITTEE E, supra note 126, at 1175.

168. Some of the government's research and development contracts, particularly longterm research contracts, involve a similar type of close relationship between the parties; in
these cases, as weU, enforceability has a completely different connotation. For an examination of theoretical difficulties in the application of private contract law to United States procurement practices, see Frenzen, The Administrative Contractin the United States, 37 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 270 (1968); Grossbaum, FederalSupport of Research Projects Through Contractsand Grants.A Rationale, 19 AM. U.L. REV. 423 (1970).
169. C. TURPIN & J. WHELAN, THE LONDON TRANscRIPT-A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT
PUBLIC CONTRACTING IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 3-44 (1973).
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the institutions of industrial strategy discussed above. Certainly the
N.E.B. has not realized the hopes of its progenitors of extending
public ownership into the sectors of the profitable manufacturing
industry. 7 ° So far, its role has been restricted to that of a holding
corporation for enterprises like British Leyland and Rolls-Royce, to
advise the government on certain industrial matters, and to provide
financial assistance to a relatively disparate group of small to medium-sized firms experiencing financial difficulties, or which cannot
obtain finance from other sources but whose future profitability is
not unlikely.' The failure of the N.E.B. to fully realize the hopes
of its progenitors is attributable to a number of factors. First, the
N.E.B. lacks compulsory powers of acquisition so that only firms
which cannot obtain finance elsewhere will allow the N.E.B. to acquire an equity holding. Second, the N.E.B. is undercapitalized.
The other forms of government financial assistance to industry specifically regional development grants and selective financial
72
assistance - far exceed the amounts allocated to the N.E.B.1
Certainly the relatively small sums of money the N.E.B. has, much
of which goes to British Leyland and Rolls-Royce, cannot displace
investment from existing financial institutions and from corporations' own resources. Third, the N.E.B. must earn an adequate return on capital, although a broader view might have released it
from what is essentially the same consideration which guides private industry so that it could take account of other matters such as a
wide range of economic costs and benefits external to investment.
Finally, those controlling N.E.B.'s destiny have a view of its role
quite removed from that of its founders in that they do not see the
N.E.B. as replacing existing sources of finance for industry but
rather as simply supplementing those sources.17 3 Moreover, they
see the N.E.B. as assisting small to medium firms in temporary
170. WHITE PAPER, .supra note 29, at 7.
171. "The N.E.B. has.. . been transformed from an instrument of nationalization to an
investment bank, development agency and holding company." G. GANZ, supra note 72, at
53. The government is involved in the nationalized industries, such as steel.
172. EXPENDITURE PLANS, supra note 37. By one estimate, despite an anticipated outlay

of£1 billion during the period 1977-1982, the N.E.B. will hold only two percent of the equity
in the shares on the London Stock Exchange. The Albatross Round Lord Ryder's Neck, The
Observer (London), Mar. 20, 1977, at 40, col. 1. See also N.E.B. EVIDENCE TO WILSON
COMMITTEE ON CITY (1977).
173. Cf. R. CLARKE, supra note 16, at 8 (money provided in ihe 1960's by the Industrial
Reorganization Corporation was a factor which enabled firms to undertake valuable projects
which otherwise would not have been possible). See also text accompanying notes 15-17
sspra.
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difficulties rather than effecting a change in the control or ownership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange. 174 In

sum, then, the N.E.B. will not greatly limit capitalism - ironically
in view of the motives of those who
advocated its establishment 17 5
it.
strengthen
and
but will assist
Another aspect of the N.E.B.'s operation which has yet to at-

tain full potential is the issue of industrial democracy. Initially, the
N.E.B. was to play a role in ensuring that enterprises under its control would provide for the full involvement of employees in decision-making at all levels. 176 Now the Secretary of State for
Industry has directed that the N.E.B. need only make appropriate
arrangements with the Board's subsidiaries "to ensure that the government's policies in this field are being advanced."'' 77 Some advances have been made in industrial democracy in N.E.B.
subsidiaries, 178 but much is contingent on the government's re179
sponse to the Bullock Report.

If radical critics of the N.E.B. are unhappy, industry by no
means wholeheartedly accepts it either. Industry's collective view,
in so far as it is articulated, is that government lacks the experience
and technical competence to participate directly in business

through shareholdings in corporations.

80

Government financial

assistance is welcomed, however, where private investment is not

forthcoming. Not all corporations take a hard line as witnessed by
the willingness of some corporations to accept N.E.B. participation.
Considerable skepticism has also greeted the N.E.B. and the con174. The trend of a government entity becoming increasingly influenced by commercial
factors is perhaps stronger in the B.N.O.C. See Hennessey, Unease Over Civil Servants on
National Oil Board, The Times (London), Feb. 9, 1976, at 4, col. 3.
175. See Ghai, Controland Management of the Economy.- Research Perspectives on Public
Enterprise, 9 VERFASSUNG UND RECHT IN OBERSEE 157, 160 (1976).
176. WHITE PAPER, sUpra note 29, at 7.
177. ANNUAL REPORTS 1977, supra note 30, at 59.
178. As part of the government's reorganization of Alfred Herbert, each site of the corporation elects a consultative committee which is given considerable information about the
site's prospects, performance and profitability at a monthly meeting. Guardian
(Manchester), July 12, 1977, at 16, col. 3-4.
179. This report concerns the advisability of representation of employees on boards of
directors, and the role therein of trade unions. The Committee of Inquiry, chaired by Lord
Bullock, on a split vote, reiterated the government's stated goal of the extension of industrial
democracy, by labor, in particular trade union, representation on boards of directors. The
Committee also made specific recommendations as to the best method of achieving this goal.
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY ON INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, CMND. No. 6706 (1977).
180. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY, GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 32-33
(1974). See also CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY, THE ROAD TO RECOVERY (1976).
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those who see them as one more
cept of planning agreements from
18
step toward the corporate state. '

The concept of planning agreements represents a new initiative
based upon a partnership between government and industry at the
level of the firm, the purpose of which is to improve the quantity
and quality of industry's contribution to the development and
growth of the British economy. It is hoped to achieve this by providing a framework within which decision-making by government
and management is improved by the sharing of information about
plans and objectives, and in which the.effectiveness of action to attain agreed objectives is enhanced by coordinated use of the resources of government and industry. Negotiation of a planning
agreement is said to provide a mechanism whereby industry participates in the formulation of the rules which bind it.
An assessment of the success of planning agreements in the
achievement of these goals must be suspended until they become a
more established feature of the British economy. Certainly a
significant, although rather specific, ramification of planning agreements might be in the development of government procurement
law. Planning agreements might, for example, by creating closer
links between government and industry, bring about a better understanding between these parties in their commercial dealings.
These agreements might provide information to government contractors concerning the projected demands of government; in return, government might obtain information about how its suppliers
are working, new designs in the planning, the proposed acquisition
of new plants, as well as a multitude of other valuable information.
This information might, inter alia, lead to financial and other assistance by government to indigenous industry which may in turn encourage industry to supply government requirements so as to
reduce the proportion of government procurement from overseas.

181. Winkler, Law, State and Economy: The Industry Act 1975 in Context, 2 BRIT. J.L.
AND SOC'Y 103 (1975); contra, Hadden, The IndustryAct 1975, 39 MOD. L. REV. 318, 319
(1976).
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